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Research as to whether amnesic people are able to extract gist in a converging semantic 
associates paradigm, known as the DRM paradigm, has produced inconsistent results in the 
literature. For the first time, this paper presents the performance of a young amnesic person 
(CJ) in this task, who acquired his memory disorder at the age of 11 years and was tested 
four years post-injury. In contrast with much of the data in the adult amnesia literature, CJ 
was found to be sensitive to the DRM manipulation at a level comparable to controls in 
recognition and at a level higher than controls in free recall. In addition, a detailed analysis of 
recall intrusions other than the critical word lent further support to the main finding that CJ is 
able to extract gist on the basis of semantic associations. Results are discussed with 
reference to the fuzzy-trace theory, the associative-activation theory and the activation-
monitoring framework of false memories, as well as the potential role of an impaired and 
immature cognitive system in adopting a semantic gist strategy in the absence of episodic 
memory.  
 










Gist memory refers to our ability to form and retain a conceptual or meaning-based 
representation of information. A prominent laboratory demonstration of gist extraction is a 
converging semantic associates paradigm known as the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In a typical DRM task, participants are presented with a list of 
words that are strong associates of a non-presented ‘critical’ word. For example, participants 
may be presented with words such as bed, rest, awake, tired, dream etc., but the critical 
word on which the list words converge (i.e. sleep) is omitted from presentation. After 
studying a series of such lists, memory for the presented items is typically tested in 
recognition, or in both free recall and recognition. It has been repeatedly found that intrusion 
of the non-presented critical word at test (i.e. false recognition or false recall) is 
extraordinarily high in healthy adults (e.g. Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999). Moreover, 
approximately by age 11 typically developing children perform very similarly to adults in this 
task (e.g. Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002; Dewhurst and Robinson, 2004; Howe, Cicchetti, 
Toth, & Cerrito, 2004). Due to the robustness of findings in healthy populations, the DRM 
effect has been understood as a ‘normal distortion’ of memory, which demonstrates a) our 
ability to extract gist from the presented information by successfully processing the semantic 
relationships amongst them during study, and b) that such processing occurs at the cost of 
generating false memories.  
Three though not mutually exclusive, theories have been proposed to explain the processes 
involved in the DRM effect. The fuzzy-trace theory postulates that memory for studied items 
is based on two types of representations that form in parallel during study (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 1998). A gist representation is built up from associative information and contains the 
general meaning and interpretations conveyed during the study phase, whereas a verbatim 
representation preserves item-specific information about studied items. While both 
representations support veridical memory, they have the opposite effects on false memory at 




test: gist retrieval enhances it, verbatim retrieval inhibits it. Therefore, when participants are 
tested on tasks that promote the formation of a strong gist representation, such as the DRM 
procedure, their overreliance on gist will lead them to falsely accept test items that match 
this representation. The activation-monitoring framework on the other hand (e.g. Roediger & 
McDermott, 2000; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) emphasizes a two-stage 
process involving cognitive control: the critical word may be activated through semantic 
associations (either consciously or unconsciously) during study, which in turn creates a 
source-monitoring problem at test whereby participants have to distinguish between 
presented items and those activated mentally. Finally, a prominent theory in the 
developmental literature, the associative-activation theory proposes that the DRM effect is a 
product of associative-activation processes between list items and the critical word, and 
crucially, there is no requirement for a separate gist trace activation in order for false 
memories to occur (Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009). Further, the automaticity 
with which children activate associations in their semantic memory shows a developmental 
trend such that automaticity increases as they get older, and so does their false memory 
output (Howe et al, 2009).  
The performance of adult amnesic people in the DRM paradigm has been of particular 
interest for some time, though findings are inconsistent. Several well-documented 
observations about the pattern of memory impairments in amnesia lead to the hypothesis 
that these patients would be just as susceptible, if not more susceptible, to the DRM effect 
as people with intact memory.  First, amnesic patients have been shown to be sensitive to 
pre-experimental semantic manipulations. In paired-associates learning paradigms, for 
instance, learning of strongly related word pairs is often better preserved than that of 
unrelated word pairs (e.g. Cutting, 1978; Shimamura & Squire, 1984; Winocur & Weiskrantz, 
1976). Second, amnesic people tend to make more false positive errors in recognition tests 
than healthy controls (e.g. Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Verfaellie & Treadwell, 1993), and also 
often intrude more words in free recall (e.g. Schnider et al., 1996). Yet, contrary to 




expectations, DRM experiments carried out with adult amnesic patients (including Korsakoff 
amnesic people, amnesic patients with mixed etiologies and patients with dementia of the 
Alzheimer type) have typically reported reduced rates of false recognition of the critical word 
(e.g. Hudon et al., 2006; Schacter, Verfaellie, & Pradere, 1996a; Schacter, Verfaellie, & 
Anes, 1997; Schacter, Verfaellie, Anes, & Racine, 1998; Verfaellie, Schacter, & Cook, 2002). 
These findings occurred in the context of overall reduced hit rates for studied items but 
increased false recognition for other distracters. Based on this pattern, Schacter et al. 
(1996a) suggested that the formation of semantic gist representation depends on the same 
medial temporal lobe structures that also underlie veridical memory. More specifically, they 
argued that it is amnesic patients’ reduced capacity to retain studied items that impedes the 
formation of a gist representation, ultimately causing reduced false memory for critical words 
in the DRM paradigm. In other words, as Melo et al. (1999, p. 344) noted, when few, if any, 
of the associates (true targets) are remembered, as in the case of amnesia, there is 
effectively no medial temporal lobe output that can be prone to distortion [therefore] there is 
little opportunity for a related test item to match a semantic gist representation.  
Indeed, it has been demonstrated that increasing amnesic patients’ veridical memory by 
multiple exposure to DRM lists can lead to a corresponding increase in gist-based false 
recognition across trials (Schacter et al., 1998). As predicted by the fuzzy-trace theory, this 
manipulation had the opposite effect on controls, whereby trial by trial increase in veridical 
memory corresponded with decreasing levels of false recognition of the critical word (see 
also Benjamin, 2001). Similar findings were reported more recently by Nissan, Abrahams 
and Della Sala (2013) in a case of amnesia, DA. DA was sensitive to the DRM effect in 
recognition memory to the same level as controls if veridical memory was increased by 
bringing her to a learning criterion of 50% correct recall on each list prior to the recognition 
test. Taken together, these studies strongly suggest that there needs to be a threshold level 
‘true memory’ output in order for the DRM effect to occur, and therefore, in tests of 




recognition, matching veridical memory performance between patients and controls is 
essential to make meaningful inferences about amnesic patients’ ability to extract gist.  
Besides, to our knowledge, only a few studies used immediate free recall (i.e. after each 
study list) as a means of testing the DRM effect and the ability to form gist in amnesia. 
Unfortunately, Nissan et al. (2013) did not report whether or not their procedure (noted 
above) had led to critical word or other extra-task intrusions. In studies by Schacter et al. 
(1996a) and Melo et al. (1999), amnesic patients’ critical word intrusion was comparable to 
controls, but the findings did not receive much attention as evidence of gist memory because 
amnesic participants also produced significantly more extra-task intrusions, thus weakening 
the DRM effect when adjusted measures were considered. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy 
that in Schacter’s (1996a) study, extra-task intrusions produced by amnesic adults were 
predominantly semantically related to lists, which likely reflects gist memory. By our view, 
such observations warrant closer examination of the recall output. Therefore, in the present 
study we will return this issue with a careful examination of recall data to offer further insights 
about gist processing in the case reported here. 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has considered the DRM effect in 
developmental cases of memory impairment. Here, for the first time, we report the 
performance of a young patient, CJ, in the DRM task. This work was motivated by the 
above-outlined inconsistencies in the literature as to whether amnesic patients are able to 
extract gist in this task. Having demonstrated strengths in semantic memory in the context of 
profound episodic memory and executive function difficulties (see neuropsychological 
profile), CJ’s performance can be particularly informative to theories of gist memory in 
amnesia.  With detailed analyses of free recall and recognition performance, we sought to 
offer additional insights into the DRM effect from a developmental perspective, and the 
conditions under which amnesic patients may be able to form and/or maintain a gist 
representation in this task. Special attention was paid to extra-task intrusions which are often 
overlooked in studies of amnesia using the DRM paradigm. A few adjustments have been 




made in the procedure to accommodate CJ’s profound memory impairments as well as to 
enable meaningful inferences. Informed by previous studies, steps were taken to match 
recognition memory performance between CJ and controls, which are described in detail 
later.  
The profile of CJ’s retained abilities with relative strengths in semantic memory and short-
term retention of information (see neuropsychological profile), and the design characteristics 
of the DRM paradigm may contribute to effective processing of semantic relationships 
between study items, and the formation of a gist representation that is accessible for at least 
a short period of time. Therefore, it was predicted that CJ would most likely be  able to 
demonstrate the DRM effect under conditions of immediate free recall and possibly 
recognition by producing the critical non-presented word at a rate comparable to or higher 
than controls.  
Case report  
At the time of this study, CJ was a 15-year-old childhood brain tumor survivor whose case 
history has been reported elsewhere in detail (see Pauly-Takacs, Moulin & Estlin, 2011, 
2012; Pauly-Takacs & Moulin, 2017). In brief, he was diagnosed with and successfully 
treated for a metastasized primary suprasellar germinoma at the age of 11 years.  Figure 1 
shows complete remission from cancer, but a resultant marked and generalized cerebral 
atrophy and associated white matter loss post treatment. Bilateral volume loss to the 
hippocampus was also noted in post-treatment clinical MRI scan reports.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
CJ’s behavior, as described by his parents and observed by us, was consistent with a 
profound amnesic condition. For example, he was disoriented in time and place and needed 




full parental support to schedule and carry out routine daily tasks. He was unable to maintain 
a record of ongoing activities and could not give a coherent account of what happened the 
day before or even earlier in the day. CJ was almost never able to answer questions about 
his personal past without substantial cueing, and even so, he often commented that he just 
“worked it out” rather than remembered events.  
CJ returned to mainstream secondary education after his treatment was completed but he 
was only able to achieve average to good marks in subjects that he had substantial prior 
knowledge of. Initially he outperformed his peers on a general knowledge test. By contrast, 
the acquisition of novel concepts and terminology especially in newly introduced subjects 
became a significant challenge for him ultimately leading to a decline in his school 
performance. Due to his severely compromised navigation skills, he needed 1:1 support to 
find his way around at school at all times. Despite his extensive brain injury, there was no 
indication of significant language impairment; CJ’s spontaneous speech was fluent, 
syntactically correct and he was able to communicate effectively. CJ was also able to learn 
people’s names and novel facts with sufficient repetition. The impression that CJ left us with 
is that of a friendly and ingenious young man who had very little awareness of the profound 
nature and consequences of his memory deficit.  
Neuropsychological Profile  
Neuropsychological assessments were carried out successively, once CJ had recovered 
from his acute illness, at the age of 13 to 15. His overall neuropsychological profile and his 
everyday behavior post treatment reflects a profound anterograde amnesia with additional 
executive function difficulties (Table 1).  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 




As such, CJ does not present with a pure case of amnesia, but his neuropsychological 
profile is evidently characterized by a discrepancy between verbal IQ (taking the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-IV) Verbal Comprehension Index as a proxy measure; 
Wechsler, 2003) and episodic memory (Children’s Memory Scale (CMS) Indices; Cohen, 
1997). Notably, some of the subtests pertaining to language function are in the above 
average range (e.g. word reading and spelling; Wechsler Individual Achievement Test 
(WIAT-II); Wechsler, 2005). Similarly, his scores are in the high average range on the British 
Picture Vocabulary test (BPVS-II; Dunn & Dunn, 1997) to suggest preserved semantic 
memory and relatively high premorbid intelligence. By contrast, CJ has shown virtually no 
episodic memory in standardized tests. For example, in the stories task of the Children’s 
Memory Scale CJ was able to remember the general gist of the story, but had great difficulty 
retrieving specific details both immediately and after a 30-minute delay. 
With respect to tests of working memory, the temporary storage of information is less 
affected in CJ relative to the ability of storing and manipulating information simultaneously, 
suggesting some residual normality in the short-term storage component of this memory 
system. CJ was capable of achieving within normal limits performance on forward digit span, 
but he performed consistently poorly on backward digit span and letter-number sequencing 
tasks yielding a poor overall Working Memory Index (Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children (WISC-IV); Wechsler, 2003). 
CJ also shows signs of a significant executive function deficit which exacerbates his memory 
difficulties. He experiences difficulties with task switching, inhibition, planning and organizing 
behavior as measured by the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System test battery (D-KEFS; 
Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001). He shows a disproportionate impairment on the category 
switching task suggesting that his main impairment is in cognitive flexibility and not in verbal 
fluency per se. He did not make any perseverative errors, but he tended to produce distal 
repetition errors. These suggest problems with inhibitory control and monitoring, which were 




also evident from his frequent set-loss errors as well as his low scores on the color-word 
interference task.  
In sum, CJ’s neuropsychological profile shows a notable dissociation between episodic and 
semantic memory in the context of complex cognitive difficulties: as in amnesia, he has a 
profound episodic memory disorder while verbal skills that draw on semantic memory are 
relatively well preserved. This finding is consistent with his behavior in the real world such 
that CJ is able to use language effectively in everyday situations. On an anecdotal note, CJ 
enjoyed completing verbal tasks as part of neuropsychological assessments and 
commented that he was “good with words”. Indeed, it is CJ’s well-preserved verbal skills that 
permitted extensive experimental work into his residual memory abilities using verbal 
materials, as in the task reported here.  
Method 
Control participants 
Ten control participants (7 male) matched on years of education were drawn from CJ’s class 
in a mainstream school. The mean age of controls was 13.07 years (SD=0.48). All 
participants, including CJ, and their parents signed written consent to participate in the 
study, and in the case of controls, for the test session to take place at school (CJ was tested 
at home). The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Institute of Psychological 
Sciences at the University of Leeds.  
Materials and Procedure 
Twelve 12-item semantically associated word-lists were adapted from previously published 
materials which produced a robust DRM effect in adolescents or adults (Carneiro, 
Albuquerque, Fernandez and Esteves, 2007; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; see Appendix 1 
for the lists used). In a few instances the associates were replaced by another word to adjust 
to British English (e.g. pavement instead of sidewalk), or because the new word seemed 




more likely to elicit the critical word (bite instead of canine). In any instances of replacement, 
the Birkbeck word association norms were used as reference (Moss & Older, 1996).  
A 72-item recognition test was designed to include 36 studied words (targets) and 36 non-
studied words (distracters). The target words were those presented in positions 1, 5 and 12 
of each of the previously seen lists. The 36 distracters comprised the 12 critical words as 
well as 24 other words which were not associated semantically to any of the study lists or to 
each other. The unrelated distracters were carefully selected from other DRM lists not used 
in this study. Similarly to the study by Roediger and McDermott (1995), the recognition test 
was of a blocked design whereby each block corresponded to a studied list. Each block 
comprised six items; three studied items, two unrelated distracters and the critical word. 
Each block began with a target item and ended with the critical word, the remaining items 
were arranged in a random order in between. The order of the blocks corresponded with the 
order in which the lists were studied.  
In keeping with CJ’s profound memory impairment and difficulty to remain focused on 
lengthy tasks, the task was administered to him over two sessions, one week apart. That is, 
in each session he was tested on six lists only, while control participants were administered 
the full set of 12 lists in one session. Words were presented individually on a computer 
screen at a rate of 2 sec per word. Participants were instructed to read the words out loud 
and to try to memorize them for a later test. Once they finished reading the first list, they 
were asked to recall as many words as they could. They were instructed that they could 
recall the words in any order and that they should try not to guess. Participants were given 
approximately 2 minutes for recall. Following this, presentation of the next list began, to be 
followed by an immediate free recall test as described above. This procedure repeated with 
subsequent lists until the recognition test was administered. 
Recognition data was collected across two tests in a blocked design.  CJ was tested after 
the third and the sixth list with each test comprising 18 items. To keep the structure of the 




procedure constant between CJ and controls, control participants were also tested on the 
first and the second half of the materials separately (i.e. after the sixth and the twelfth list) 
such that each recognition test comprised 36 items. The motivation behind testing CJ on 
fewer lists was to attempt to match recognition accuracy to controls in the standard 
component of the task (i.e. discounting responses for the critical distracters). To reduce the 
impact of short-term memory, all participants were engaged in a brief (approximately 2 
minutes) conversation break immediately preceding a recognition test. Test items were read 
to the participants and they were asked to indicate with a yes or no answer whether the word 
was part of either of the lists they studied earlier. Study-test blocks were counterbalanced in 
the control group such that half of the participants were presented with lists 1-6 before the 
first recognition test, while the other half started with lists 7-12. For controls the task took 
approximately 40 minutes to complete, whereas CJ’s sessions lasted approximately 20 
minutes each.  
Results 
Recall 
The recall data was analyzed using the cumulative recall score obtained across the 12 word 
lists. Our analysis strategy was to compare CJ’s performance to controls with a modified t-
test developed for single case studies (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002). The mean proportion 
of studied and critical words recalled by CJ and controls is shown in Figure 2. CJ recalled 
significantly fewer studied words than did controls, tmod (9) = -2.45, p = .04, zCC = -2.34. 
However, for the non-presented critical word the inverse pattern was observed such that CJ 
recalled a much higher proportion of critical words than did controls. More specifically, he 
recalled the critical word for nine out of the 12 lists which resulted in a significantly higher 
false recall rate relative to controls, tmod (9) = 2.44, p = .04, zCC = 2.59.  
 




Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Extra task intrusions 
Despite the instruction to avoid guessing, intrusions other than the critical word also 
occurred in the output of both CJ and controls. On average, CJ produced 1.40 other 
intrusions per list, which was significantly higher than the average number of intrusions 
produced by controls, (M = 0.25, SD = 0.12), tmod (9) = 9.30, p < .0001, zCC = 9.58. To 
determine the frequency of intrusions relative to the total words recalled in the task, 
proportional scores were calculated for both critical words and other intrusions. These 
measures showed that critical and other word intrusions only minimally contributed to control 
participants’ total recall output; with 4% and 3% respectively. By contrast,10% and 19% of 
CJ’s total output was made up of critical words and other intrusions, respectively. Thus, his 
proportional intrusion rates were significantly higher for both critical word intrusions, tmod (9) = 
2.86, p = .02, zCC = 2.92, and other intrusions, tmod (9) = 7.63, p < .0001, zCC = 9.55, when 
compared to controls.  
In light of the observed differences between CJ and controls with regard to the number of 
intrusions produced, an adjusted measure of critical recall was calculated for each 
participant. To take the number of other intrusions into account, critical word recall was 
expressed as a proportion of the total number of intrusions (critical words + other intrusions). 
According to this correction, CJ intruded a numerically smaller but non-significant proportion 
of critical words (.35) than control participants (M = 0.52, SD = 0.23), tmod (9) = -0.71, p = .50, 
zCC = -0.74. Taken together, these analyses caution that CJ’s generally greater tendency to 
produce intrusions may have contributed to his extraordinarily high recall of critical words 
(see Figure 2.). Nevertheless, we contend that the corrected recall score for critical words 
should not automatically be regarded as a more valid measure of gist memory. Despite CJ’s 
greater tendency for intrusions in general, the finding that he recalled significantly more 




critical words than controls, cannot be ignored. Furthermore, intrusions other than the critical 
word may also reflect gist-based false memories if they are strongly semantically related to 
the lists. This possibility will be examined next.  
At face value all of CJ’s other intrusions appeared semantically related to their respective 
lists. Therefore, to obtain a finer measure, our analyses concerned the extent to which 
intrusions were semantically related to lists. Neither CJ nor controls intruded studied words 
from previous lists. Seven independent expert raters (blind to the purpose of the study and 
the source of intrusions) rated all critical words and all other intrusions produced by CJ and 
controls; they were asked to judge, on a seven-point scale, how well a given word fit the 
respective DRM list. The results showed that the critical words received the highest overall 
rating (M = 6.82, SD = 0.47) confirming that the DRM lists were successfully adapted. The 
second highest overall rating was given to CJ’s other intrusions (M = 5.50, SD = 1.74), while 
control participants’ intrusions received a lower overall rating (M = 4.20, SD = 2.41). An item 
by item analysis performed on the semantic relatedness ratings for CJ and controls showed 
that across all other intrusions the ratings given for CJ’s intrusions were significantly higher 
than those given for controls’ intrusions, t (293.79) = 6.62, p < .001, suggesting that CJ’s 
intrusions were more semantically related to the lists presented than those produced by 
control participants. To elucidate these results, some example intrusions with their semantic 
relatedness ratings are provided. The three lists for which CJ did not recall the critical word 
he produced intrusions such as collie (for dog; 5.86), sandstone, clay (for stone; 5.43 and 
5.14), clarinet, harmony (for music; 6.57 and 6.71). For the list where the critical word was 
tooth, he falsely recalled the words molar, canine and incisor, all of which received semantic 
relatedness ratings of 6.50 and higher. The lowest ratings were given to two intrusions, 
encyclopedia (3.29) and dictionary (3.43) produced for the list converging on book. Other 
relatively low ratings include ugly (4.29) and autumn (4.71) for lists converging on face and 
tree, respectively. These examples demonstrate that CJ often falsely recalled category 




exemplars or other strong associates of the non-presented critical word which suggests that 
his intrusions are supported by semantic gist.  
Recognition 
The recognition data was analyzed using participants’ cumulative performance across 
multiple recognition tests. As can be seen in Table 2, CJ’s proportional hit rate to true targets 
was equal to the mean proportional hit rate obtained by controls, tmod (9) = 0. False 
recognition of unrelated distracters was relatively low for both CJ and the control group with 
CJ producing numerically more, but not significantly different number of false alarms for this 
type of distracter, tmod (9) = 1.91, p = .09, zCC = 2.29. To obtain a corrected measure of true 
recognition, false alarm rates to unrelated distracters were subtracted from hit rates to true 
targets (Budson, Desikan, Daffner, & Schacter, 2001). Comparison of CJ’s and controls’ 
adjusted hit rate revealed no significant difference between scores, tmod (9) = -0.82, p = .43, 
zCC = -0.86, which demonstrates that recognition performance on the standard component of 
the task (i.e. discounting responses to critical words) was successfully matched between CJ 
and controls. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Of crucial importance is the proportion of critical distracters relative to the proportion of 
unrelated distracters endorsed by CJ and controls. To obtain an unbiased measure of gist 
memory, the proportion of unrelated distracters was subtracted from the proportion of critical 
distracters (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; Budson et al., 2001). As shown in Table 2, both CJ and 
controls displayed great differences between false recognition of critical and unrelated 
distracters. A paired samples t-test confirmed that control participants’ false recognition was 
significantly higher for critical than unrelated distracters, t (9) = 7.73, p < .001, d = 3.18, 




which suggests that their high rate of false recognition for critical words (i.e. 61%) was not 
due to response bias but was sign of a genuine DRM effect. CJ’s false recognition of critical 
words was at ceiling (i.e. he endorsed all 12 items). However, one of our control participants 
also endorsed all 12 critical words (range in controls 2 to 12 words), and false recognition of 
the critical word was high in the control group in general (Mdn = 7.5; Mode = 6, 9). As a 
result, the modified t-test did not find any difference between CJ and controls, tmod (9) = 1.49, 
p = .17, zCC = 1.60. Overall, CJ’s gist memory (i.e. adjusted false recognition) was within 
normal limits, tmod (9) = 1.31, p = .22, zCC = 1.38. To conclude, both CJ and control 
participants show a genuine DRM effect whereby high rate of false recognition of critical 
items cannot be explained by a generally liberal criterion for accepting test items as 
previously seen. 
Discussion 
For the first time in the literature, we presented the performance of an adolescent patient 
with a profound memory impairment in the DRM task. The aim of this work was to further 
elucidate amnesic patients’ ability to form and maintain gist based on semantic associative 
processes whilst offering insights from a developmental perspective. CJ clearly 
demonstrated the DRM effect in recognition at a rate comparable to controls, and uniquely in 
studies carried out with amnesic people, he also demonstrated a strong DRM effect in recall 
at a rate significantly higher than controls. We will start by discussing the recognition 
findings, followed by a more detailed discussion of recall results. 
Replicating previous findings carried out with similar age groups (Carnerio et al., 2007; 
Metzger et al., 2008), both CJ’s and control participants’ memory was highly vulnerable to 
the DRM manipulation in tests of recognition. Thus, even though CJ produced false alarms 
to all critical distracters, his performance was not significantly different from his healthy 
peers. High rates of false recognition for critical words were obtained in the context of high 
veridical recognition and relatively low false positives for unrelated distracters in the case of 




both CJ and controls, consistent with the view that gist-based false memory depends on 
sufficient encoding of semantic associates (Schacter et al., 1998). The normality of CJ’s 
performance in this recognition task resembles those with developmental amnesia (DA), a 
memory disorder resulting from early and selective bilateral hippocampal pathology (Gadian 
et al., 2000; Vargha-Khadem et al, 1997), where preserved recognition memory (but 
impaired recall) has been confirmed as a characteristic feature of the condition (Adlam, 
Malloy, Mishkin, & Vargha-Khadem, 2009; Baddeley, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 2001). It 
is important to note however, that the high degree of similarity between the performance of 
CJ and controls was achieved by an adjustment in procedure which reduced memory load 
and the delay between CJ’s first encounter with the DRM lists and the recognition test. The 
purpose of this modification was to attempt to increase CJ’s veridical recognition 
performance and potentially match that with controls - at least proportionally - in order to 
derive meaningful inferences about CJ’s ability to form a gist representation. A very low level 
of corrected veridical recognition memory score may mistakenly lead to underestimating the 
patient’s ability to rely on a gist representation. Our data suggests that CJ performs similarly 
to controls in that he is able to derive the gist under conditions where memory load and the 
delay between study and test are optimized for his episodic memory deficit. Our findings are 
consistent with other patient work where modifications in procedure ensured that there is 
sufficient item-specific memory output from which to extract gist (Schacter et al., 1998; 
Nissan et al., 2013). 
CJ’s high recognition accuracy suggests that task characteristics inherent in the DRM 
paradigm are particularly beneficial for his memory. More specifically, a converging semantic 
associates paradigm promoted the formation of a strong gist representation during study 
which supported not only his decisions to accept items that matched this representation but 
also to reject those that did not. In other words, being able to rely on gist, CJ was able to 
adopt a relatively conservative response criterion. However, as predicted by the fuzzy-trace 
theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998), not being able to rely on a strong verbatim trace, this 




response criterion was not conservative enough to suppress false recognition of the critical 
word.  
CJ’s performance was strikingly different from that of controls for immediate free recall. He 
recalled significantly fewer studied items but, as predicted, significantly more non-presented 
critical words compared to his healthy peers. By showing marked differences in this 
direction, CJ’s performance pattern is unique amongst studies carried out with people with 
significant memory impairment. CJ’s strong tendency to falsely recall the critical word 
suggests that he is able to extract the semantic gist in a list learning task and use this 
information to guide his recall. Additional analyses of other extra-task intrusions revealed 
that although CJ had a greater tendency than controls to intrude non-presented words, these 
were not arbitrary. Rather, they were semantically related to the respective DRM lists 
providing further evidence that recall was driven by gist. In light of the finding that typically 
developing 11-year-old children (i.e. CJ’s age at injury) make more semantic intrusions than 
other types of recall error in the DRM task (Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004), CJ’s performance 
demonstrates a particularly high degree of susceptibility to gist-based false memories in a 
developmental context. CJ’s strong tendency to intrude semantically related words into his 
recall can also be accommodated by the associative activation theory (Howe et al 2009); by 
this account, CJ activated associations in his well-retained semantic knowledge base rather 
like healthy adults (i.e. automatically) ultimately leading to an increased level of false 
memories. 
There are several factors that were likely to contribute to the particular pattern of CJ’s recall 
performance, which will be discussed in turn. Given the immediacy of recall, the contribution 
of short-term memory is evident (c.f. Van Damme and d’Ydewalle, 2009a), although short-
term memory capacity alone does not explain the processes involved in gist extraction and 
subsequent false recall. We propose that CJ’s performance may be a consequence of 
severe episodic memory loss combined with monitoring difficulties subserved by frontal 
regions of the brain. It is well established that the prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in 




monitoring and verifying the output from memory (e.g. Moscovitch & Melo, 1997). By this 
account, the impoverished verbatim trace (i.e. impaired veridical recall) may have forced CJ 
to rely on the gist trace which he successfully formed during study, ultimately leading him to 
mentally generate items which matched this representation, including the critical word and 
other gist-relevant words. In addition to this, deficient monitoring of gist-related information 
further contributed to an unverified recall output characterized by a high proportion of false 
memories. Indeed, a striking finding in CJ’s recall output was that all intrusions were 
semantically related to their respective list, more so than intrusions produced by control 
participants. This lends further support to the main finding of this report: CJ’s retrieval in the 
DRM task is strongly driven by gist. 
Melo et al. (1999) have attempted to delineate the influence of temporal and frontal damage 
alone or in combination on false memory in the DRM paradigm. They have found that those 
patients whose amnesia was complicated with frontal deficits (i.e. functionally most 
comparable to CJ) were not sensitive to the DRM effect in either recall or recognition. 
However, patients with a pure form of amnesia appeared more prone than controls to intrude 
the critical word into recall, although the difference was not significant. Thus, curiously, CJ’s 
performance in the DRM task is more similar to those adults with amnesia who do not have 
additional frontal difficulties, despite the fact that such neuropsychological difficulties are 
clearly present. Melo et al. (1999) proposed that the reason why those patients with 
combined medial-temporal and frontal deficit did not display the DRM effect is mainly due to 
the fact that they were unable to derive the gist or use it effectively because of poor strategic 
processing. That is, in their view, strategic processing is required for extracting gist in the 
DRM paradigm. The data obtained from CJ is in contrast with this proposal and suggests 
that it is possible to successfully extract and rely on gist representation (at least in this 
paradigm) despite severe impairments in episodic memory and a range of executive 
functions. We suggest that age at injury might account for this difference, however, in the 
absence of studies using the DRM paradigm in childhood-onset amnesia it is not possible to 




fully appreciate this possibility. Further to this, neuropsychological evidence suggests that 
the ability to extract gist from semantic associates and the ability to monitor the output from 
memory do not rely on the same areas of the frontal cortex. Schacter et al. (1996b) reported 
a case (BG), whose injury affected the lateral regions of the right frontal lobe and has shown 
a striking over-reliance on memory for the general characteristics of a study episode, but 
was unable to effectively monitor related, specific information. Another patient (JB), who had 
a putative lesion to the prefrontal cortex, experienced the added difficulty of being unable to 
extract gist (Parkin, Bindschaedler, Harsent, & Metzler, 1996). More recently Warren et al. 
(2014) found that damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex also led to a reduction in the 
DRM effect. What can be concluded from this is that CJ’s diffuse brain injury has either 
spared the prefrontal cortex sufficiently enough for him to be able to extract gist in the DRM 
paradigm, or alternatively, extracting gist from semantically associated words is less reliant 
on strategic processing than thought. 
In fact, studies carried out with Korsakoff amnesic patients are in support of this latter 
suggestion. Van Damme and d’Ydewalle (2009b; 2010) reported that Korsakoff amnesic 
patients’ veridical and false memory scores were diminished only in explicit memory tests, 
but not when memory was tested implicitly. Employing a ‘think aloud’ protocol, Van Damme 
and d’Ydewalle (2010) found that even though patients verbalized fewer critical words than 
controls during study, they showed normal priming for these words. This led the authors to 
conclude that amnesic patients do not need to consciously activate the critical words in order 
to extract gist in the DRM paradigm. 
One of the earliest ideas to explain false memory phenomena in the context of verbal 
learning also emphasizes the importance of implicit associations. The implicit associative 
response (IAR) theory postulates that false memories arise because semantic associates of 
the presented words become activated during study through automatically spreading 
activations (Underwood, 1965). Underwood does not rule out the possibility that sometimes 
the activated word reaches conscious awareness: It must be clear that IAR, in most 




theoretical formulations, is conceived of as actually occurring. This is to say, it is not a 
hypothetical construct. It is hypothetical only in the sense that it is assumed to occur in a 
particular situation where it cannot be observed directly, and this assumption is made 
because it has been observed to occur overtly with a certain frequency in other situations 
(Underwood, 1965, p. 122). An anecdotal note from our work illustrates this point. CJ 
enjoyed completing this task, and despite no reference made to the fact that the words to be 
presented would be related to each other in some way, he often commented on the lists 
during presentation, for example: “These words all have to do with sleep!” He was keen to 
discover the theme of a list during study, and in doing so, he activated the critical non-
presented word by overt verbalization for three of the lists. He also anticipated that all lists 
will have a theme, and often asked what the next set of words “would be about”. These 
observations confirm that CJ engaged with semantic processing to form a gist representation 
during study and lend direct support to the activation-monitoring theory of false memories 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 2000); CJ activated critical words during study and endorsed 
them at test as a result of committing reality monitoring errors. Conscious activation of the 
critical lure at study, as observed in CJ, typically strengthens the illusion (e.g. Seamon et al., 
2002), unless participants engage in a specific form of retrieval monitoring whereby, they 
recall-to-reject the critical lure, which in turn leads to decreased susceptibility to the DRM 
effect. Such monitoring often occurs when participants are explicitly warned of the illusion 
(Neuschatz, Benoit, & Payne, 2003), but can also occur without warning (Carneiro, 
Fernandez, & Dias, 2009). Relevant to our study, Carneiro et al. found age-related effects in 
whether or not participants apply a recall-to-reject strategy as a function of identifiability of 
the critical lure. For highly identifiable critical distracters adults employed a recall-to-reject 
strategy resulting in a reduced DRM effect, but children and pre-adolescents (i.e. 11-12-year 
olds) produced more false memories for such distracters. In light of these findings, CJ’s high 
rate of free recall of the critical word demonstrates a particularly high degree of DRM 
susceptibility relative to controls. His performance is beyond what could be explained by 
normative immaturity of monitoring abilities and is therefore most likely a consequence of his 




brain injury affecting prefrontal regions. Related to this, we have shown elsewhere that CJ 
has particular difficulty with adopting the recall-to-reject strategy even if there is sufficient 
source information available to support such decisions (Pauly-Takacs & Moulin, 2017).  
Limitations and future directions 
In summary, the present paper furthers our understanding of the DRM effect in amnesia and 
the neuropsychological circumstances under which gist extraction may occur. CJ’s 
performance demonstrated sensitivity to the DRM illusion with particularly high susceptibility 
in free recall conditions; a result not typically found in the adult amnesia literature. Our 
results suggest that neither profound episodic memory difficulties nor deficits in executive 
function necessarily impede semantic associative activation processes to extract and 
maintain gist. Our patient’s DRM susceptibility is best explained by well-retained semantic 
memory processes coupled with poor metacognitive monitoring of the activated memory 
output.  
Due to the diffuse nature of CJ’s brain injury acquired in childhood, and the unavailability of 
detailed neuroanatomical data we were unable to relate findings to specific brain regions 
implicated in the component processes of the DRM effect. Rather, our approach was to 
provide a detailed analysis of performance and contextualized this with existing theories and 
neuropsychological findings concerning the phenomenon. One possibility is that CJ’s unique 
pattern of brain injury and cognitive profile predisposed him to enhanced gist processing. 
Alternatively, profound episodic and executive deficits acquired in the context of the 
developing brain might exacerbate cognitive weaknesses (i.e. monitoring) whilst leaving 
other functions, such as semantic memory, intact. CJ’s case demonstrates that gist 
extraction may become habitual by way of adapting to life without episodic memory as an 
adolescent. Indeed, it was found elsewhere that CJ adopts a semantic gist strategy when 
attempting to retrieve daily life events, and he does so without prompting (Pauly-Takacs, 
Moulin & Estlin, 2011). Further support for this possibility comes from studies carried out in 




developmental amnesia which have demonstrated that not only do DA patients retain the 
capacity to learn new semantic information (e.g. Baddeley et al, 2001; Gardiner, Brandt, 
Baddeley, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 2008; Guillery-Girard, Martins, Parisot-Carbuccia, & 
Eustache, 2004; for a review see Elward & Vargha-Khadem, 2018), but may even use 
semantic gist to boost episodic-like recall (Brandt, Gardiner, Vargha-Khadem, Baddeley, & 
Mishkin, 2006). It may be the case that  semantic memory mechanisms are more available 
in developing cognitive systems in active learning environments, especially when episodic 
memory is compromised, which would explain the differences in DRM task performance 
between CJ and those that acquired amnesia in adulthood. A fruitful avenue of research 
would be to continue to examine the cognitive mechanism and brain bases underlying gist 
extraction in brain injury, especially of developmental age. In light of recent work suggesting 
that false memories induced by the DRM task primed solutions to insight-based verbal 
problems in both children and adults (Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; Howe, 
Threadgold, Norbury, Garner, & Ball, 2013), it would be particularly interesting to explore the 
adaptive nature and potential rehabilitation utility of strong false memory tendencies in other 
patients and patient groups whose deficit is similar to that of the case reported here. 
Childhood brain tumor survivors like CJ are an emerging population in neuropsychology, 
often presenting with significant episodic memory and executive function difficulties (Nagel et 
al., 2006; Conklin, Ashford, Howarth, & Merchant, 2012), thus the need for a better 
understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses in cognition to inform rehabilitation 
potential is warranted. 
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Word lists used in the DRM task 
 







read eyes hard butter note water sleep wheel puppy knob cavity 
fruits pages nose rock food sound umbrella sheets engine cat lock dentist 
nature letters  mouth floor eat piano drops pillow 
steering-
wheel 
animal house mouth 
log school freckles land sandwich sing cloud mattress van bark wood white 
root 
 
study look nature rye radio wet blanket bonnet leash key bite 
flowers reading ear throw jam band weather cosy ride collar gate gum 
forest stories wash pebble milk melody cold bedroom accident friend entrance chew 
wood sheets beautiful big flour horn thunderstorm sleepy drive bite open rotten 
plant 
 
cover person granite jelly concert winter dreams  road kennel bell paste  
shade pen  head pavement dough instrument sun lay  Ferrari hair window brush 
green pencil skin mason crust symphony liquid chair tires doghouse close  braces 
branch magazine smile heavy slice jazz wind rest transport tail latch wash 
 
The word in bold at the top of each list is the critical (non-presented) word for that list. 
  












































Table 1: Neuropsychological profile of CJ 
 
Test Scaled score Percentile Rank/ Comments 
General Cognitive Functioning 
  




  Verbal comprehension 96 39 (average) 
  Perceptual reasoning 57 0.2 
  Working memory 54 0.1 





   Receptive vocabulary 109 72 (high average) 
WIAT-II  
  
    Word reading 118 (high average) 
Reading comprehension 48 <0.1 
Pseudoword decoding 102 55 
    Numerical operations 59 0.3 
    Mathematical reasoning 56 0.2 
    Spelling 114 (high average) 
    Written expression n/c  
    Listening comprehension 82 12 
    Oral expression 74 4 
 
Memory   
 
CMS Performance Indices    




   Visual immediate memory  50 < 0.1 
   Visual delayed memory 50 < 0.1 
   Verbal immediate memory 54 0.1 
   Verbal delayed memory 54 0.1 
   Attention and concentration 82 12 
   Learning 50 < 0.1 
   Delayed recognition 66 1 
 
Executive Functioning   
 
D-KEFS    
 Verbal fluency   
   Letter fluency (total correct) 8 (low average) 
   Category fluency (total correct) 9 (average) 
   Category switching (total correct) 1 (severely impaired) 
Percent set-loss errors 1 (severely impaired) 
Percent repetition errors 1 (severely impaired) 
Color-word interference   
 Completion times   
   Color naming 7 (low average) 
   Word-reading 7 (low average) 
    Inhibition  2 (severely impaired) 
    Inhibition / Switching 3 (impaired) 
 Error analysis   
    Inhibition  3 (impaired) 
    Inhibition / Switching 1 (severely impaired) 
 Tower Test   
    Total achievement score 1 (severely impaired) 
 
Notes: WISC-IV = Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Fourth Edition; BPVS = British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale; WIAT-II = Wechsler Individual Achievement Test – Second Edition; CMS = Children’s 
Memory Scale; D-KEFS = Delis – Kaplan Executive Function System 






Table 2: Proportion of items judged ‘old’ in the DRM task by CJ and controls, and the 
adjusted recognition memory accuracy scores. 
 
CJ Controls 
Targets .86 .86 (.07) 
Critical distracters 1.00 .61 (.25) 
Unrelated distracters .08 .02 (.03) 
Adjusted true recognition .78 .84 (.07) 
Adjusted false recognition .92 .59 (.24) 
Note: Values in brackets represent one standard deviation of the mean. 
  






Figure 1: CJ’s brain following treatment with chemotherapy and radiotherapy. Marked and 
generalized cerebral atrophy and loss of hippocampal volume remain (coronal T1 weighted 
sequence with gadolinium). 
Figure 2: Proportion of studied and critical non-presented words recalled by CJ and controls. 
Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
 
 
 
 
